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Abstract 
We experimentally investigate the role of information transparency for 
equilibrium selection in stag hunt coordination games. These games can be 
transformed from a prisoner’s dilemma game by introducing a centralized reward 
or punishment scheme. We aim to explore the impact of the disclosure of 
information on how final payoffs are derived on players’ incentive to coordinate 
on the payoff-dominant equilibrium. We find that such information disclosure 
significantly increases the tendency of players to play payoff-dominant action 
and reduces the occurrence of coordination failure. The mechanism works 
directly through the positive impact of disclosure on the saliency of the payoff-
dominant equilibrium, and indirectly through the positive influence of disclosure 
on players’ belief about the likelihood of cooperation by opponent. 
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1 Introduction 
Humans are social beings; they interact constantly. They influence others and are 
influenced by others in their social surroundings. In order to survive, they need to cooperate 
with others and learn how to balance their individual interests with collective interests. To 
achieve a more socially desirable outcome they must learn how to coordinate their actions 
with other people to arrive at mutually consistent actions. Social conventions usually help 
people coordinate in social institutions (Skyrms 1996; Guala and Mittone 2010). However, 
coordination is often hampered by the failure to develop an implicit understanding of others’ 
intention and the inability to trust others’ inclinations to take a mutually desirable action. In 
such situations, people often prefer to take a safer alternative action that yields a smaller 
payoff. If everybody behaves in the same way, society is stuck with a less socially desirable 
outcome.    
To illustrate this further, consider the example of an airline company whose workers must 
prepare an airplane for departure. A timely departure requires the successful coordination of 
effort by multiple parties such as flight attendants, gate agents, mechanics, caterers, etc. If 
any party underperforms, the other departments’ endeavors to achieve on-time departure are 
wasted. Overall performance is thus dragged down by the underperforming party and the 
flight is delayed. If one party is unsure about the commitment of other parties, and is 
sufficiently risk averse, that party would respond by underperforming too. The desirable 
outcome can only be achieved if all parties are able to coordinate their efforts and are willing 
to trust others’ willingness to choose a mutually consistent action. They should be able to 
communicate seamlessly with others; however, communication is often hampered by location 
separation and hierarchical organization structure. How to make agents coordinate tacitly for 
an efficient outcome is thus an important question.  
In game theory, a coordination setting like the one described above is usually depicted as 
coordination games. These are a class of games with pure strategy Nash equilibria that can be 
Pareto ranked. Equilibrium analysis of such games lacks the predictive power to foresee 
which equilibrium the players might end up with. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) propose the 
refinement concepts of payoff-dominance and risk-dominance. An equilibrium is said to be 
payoff-dominant if it is Pareto-superior relative to other equilibria. An equilibrium whose 
deviation losses are greatest is said to be risk-dominant. In other words, strategies 
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constituting the risk-dominant equilibrium are relatively safe under strategic uncertainty. 
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) argue that payoff dominance should serve as the equilibrium-
selection criterion in coordination games. Harsanyi (1995) subsequently proposes a new 
theory of equilibrium selection and suggests that probability mixtures of multiple Nash 
Equilibria could be the solutions.  
Coordination games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria have received the lion’s share 
of attention in the experimental economics literature (see Devetag and Ortmann 2007). 
However, ample experimental evidence has shown that people often fail to coordinate on the 
payoff-dominant equilibrium (Cooper et al. 1990), especially when the group size is large 
(Van Huyck et al. 1990). The secure and inefficient risk-dominant equilibrium is more likely 
to be chosen, leading to coordination failure.1   
Numerous experimental studies have explored the determinants of coordination outcome. 
Various factors that affect the ability of subjects to overcome coordination failure have been 
examined. These factors can roughly be classified into two categories. The first category 
comprises those factors that are related to the payoff structure (i.e., the magnitudes of payoffs 
obtained from coordination); the second comprises contextual factors, such as the subject 
matching protocol, subject experience, availability of information, and the presence of 
external advice.  
Some studies have examined the role of differences in payoff structure. Battalio et al. 
(2001) show that there is a positive correlation between the occurrence of risk-dominant 
equilibrium and the optimization premium, the latter defined as the pecuniary incentive 
accrued from the difference between the payoff from the best response and the payoff from 
the inferior response to a partner’s strategy. Battalio et al. vary the size of the optimization 
premium across experimental treatments. Brandts and Cooper (2006a) show that increasing 
the bonus rate for successful coordination effectively reduces coordination failure even in the 
presence of a history of coordination failure. The effect sustains regardless of the magnitude 
and the duration of the bonus. This suggests that the presence of financial incentives that 
enhance the payoffs from coordination, even if they are only offered temporarily, can achieve 
a more efficient outcome than that achieved without financial incentives. Crawford et al. 
(2008) show that in coordination games, where the games are made realistic by describing 
                                                 
1To be consistent with the literature, we refer to cases where people coordinate on the inefficient equilibrium 
instead of the Pareto-superior equilibrium as coordination failures.  
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them using salience labels (focal points),2 even a small asymmetry in payoffs accrued to 
players is enough to soften the effectiveness of a salience label in enhancing coordination. 
Relative to a treatment where payoffs are symmetric, the presence of a small payoff 
asymmetry would increase the incidence of coordination failures by around 30 percent.  
The above studies belonging to the first category have one thing in common, namely 
varying magnitudes of payoffs across experimental treatments. Their focus is the effect of 
differences in the magnitudes of payoffs in mitigating coordination failure.  
In contrast, in the second category the magnitudes of payoffs across treatments are 
identical. Treatments are only distinguished by the underlying environment of the 
coordination games. Changing the contextual factors is often a more economical way to 
facilitate coordination than changing the magnitudes of payoffs. Its objective is to reduce 
uncertainty about opponents’ behavior and to facilitate better communication between players 
in order to develop an implicit mutual understanding and to provide assurance to players that 
others would likely play the payoff-dominant action.  
Among studies belonging to the second category, Cooper et al. (1992) study the role of 
one-way and two-way communication between players in mitigating coordination failure. 
They show that two-way communication is more effective. Van Huyck et al. (1992), Bangun 
et al. (2006), and Chaudhuri et al. (2009) study the role of non-binding external advice given 
to players to encourage them to adopt a payoff-dominant action. They show that the presence 
of external advice strengthens players’ belief in other players’ willingness to adopt payoff-
dominant action and thereby facilitates coordination. Berninghaus and Ehrhart (2001) and 
Brandts and Cooper (2006b) investigate the effect of information on opponents’ strategy in 
overcoming coordination failure. They find that revealing opponents’ previous decisions 
(either the distribution of group members’ decisions or each individual group member’s 
decision) is effective in overcoming coordination failure.     
However, these decentralized methods usually require stringent execution since a slight 
deviation from mutually optimistic beliefs may lead to coordination failure. For instance, 
two-way communication (where both players send out messages) is effective while one-way 
(only one player sends out messages) is not (Cooper et al. 1992); arbiters’ assignments are 
                                                 
2 In their experiment, the coordination games are depicted as a hypothetical setting where a pair of subjects 
agree to meet up but cannot confirm beforehand their meeting takes place. Two alternative places are given: one 
is made salient by representing it as a landmark building (e.g., the Chicago Sears Tower) while the other is a 
small, unknown building (e.g., the AT&T building).    
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credible only when they do not violate payoff dominance and symmetry (Van Huyck et al. 
1992); advice from predecessors has to be “common knowledge” as a slight deviation from it 
(i.e., advice that is “almost common knowledge”) may not work (Chaudhuri et al. 2009).   
Our study follows the line of research exploring the use of contextual factors to overcome 
coordination failure. Using 2x2 stag hunt coordination games, we study the effectiveness of 
the disclosure of information on the governance mechanism determining the payoff from 
every pair of possible strategies that subjects may choose. More specifically, the governance 
mechanisms we examine in this paper are the centralized reward and punishment schemes. 
Note that the focus of this paper is not on the use of reward or punishment themselves in 
facilitating coordination per se, but rather on the information of the underlying mechanism 
determining payoffs. The games played in the control and experimental treatments are 
identical. The payoff structures in these treatments are exactly the same. However, in the 
control treatment, we only present the final payoffs from coordination, while in the other 
treatment we provide detailed information on how those final payoffs are derived using the 
centralized reward and punishment schemes. Essentially, when these details are provided, 
subjects can see that there is a reward scheme behind the payoffs accrued from the payoff-
dominant equilibrium and a punishment scheme behind the payoffs accrued from the risk-
dominant equilibrium. We also elicit subjects’ beliefs about their opponent’s behavior, which 
may shed some light on the channels through which the mechanism works.  
Thus, in this paper, information transparency refers to the availability of detailed 
information about the institutional setting underlying the decision context and the process 
with which the final payoffs are determined. We choose a centralized punishment and reward 
scheme as an example of such context and process. Note that, obviously the centralized 
reward and punishment is not the only instrument that can transform a prisoner’s dilemma 
game to a coordination game. Indeed, even in the absence of it or any other instrument, it is 
possible that a prisoner’s dilemma game can be perceived and treated as a coordination game 
when individuals are sufficiently other-regarding (Rabin 1993; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; 
Tabellini 2008; Ellingsen et al 2012; Cason et al 2015). For instance, when individuals are 
inequality averse and are envious when facing disadvantageous inequality and compassionate 
when facing advantageous inequality in the spirit of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), there would be 
a threshold level of envy and compassion that would induce them to perceive a prisoner’s 
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dilemma game as a coordination game. 3  The inequality aversion subjectively alters the 
magnitude of payoffs accrued from all possible pair of strategies. However, across 
individuals the levels of envy and compassion are heterogeneous.  Thus, whether or not a 
prisoner’s dilemma game is perceived as a coordination game depends on subjects’ degree of 
inequality aversion, which is unobservable to the experimenter.  
In contrast, in this paper, our participants play the exact same coordination game albeit 
facing different information setting. In the baseline treatment they do not receive information 
on how the payoffs from the coordination game are derived while in the other treatment they 
do. Thus, in our study subjects uniformly faces a coordination game and see the game as a 
coordination game rather than a prisoner’s dilemma game.4 As we stressed it earlier, our 
study does not focus on the comparison between punishment and reward per se, but rather on 
the evaluation of how information provision enhances coordination. Essentially, information 
transparency increases the saliency of the payoff dominant equilibrium and positively 
influences individuals’ belief about the likelihood of cooperative play by opponent. 
 Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. Firstly, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to use information on how the payoffs from coordination are 
derived to facilitate coordination. Secondly, we show that the effect of information on players’ 
incentive to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium differs depending on the nature of 
the information provided.  
The main findings are as follows. We find that revealing information about institutional 
rules regardless of the mechanism effectively increases payoff-dominant action, thus 
substantially reducing coordination failure. Information about the reward mechanism helps 
sustain the play of the payoff-dominant strategy over time, and information about the 
punishment mechanism even slightly increases cooperation during the course of the 
                                                 
3  We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. For example, assuming that the utility of an 
inequality averse individual is ௜ܷ ൌ ݔ௜ െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔൣ൫ݔ௝ െ ݔ௜൯; 0൧ െ ߚ௜ maxൣ൫ݔ௜ െ ݔ௝൯; 0൧ for ݅ ് ݆, ߙ ൒ 0, and	ߙ ൐
ߚ.	 The individual’s degree of envy is captured by α and the degree of compassion is captured by β. It is 
straightforward to verify that the original prisoner’s dilemma game we used in this paper (see Figure 1) will be 
perceived as a coordination game if ߙ ൒ 0	and	ߚ ൐ ଵସ.   
4 It can be straightforwardly shown that an inequality averse individual with Fehr and Schmidt utility 
function would still perceive stag hunt games 1 and 2 presented in Figure 1 as stag hunt games regardless of 
how averse he (she) is to advantageous or disadvantageous inequality. Indeed, both (C, C) and (D, D) would 
remain as equilibria for all admissible values of α and β.  
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experiment. Both types of information increase agents’ beliefs 5  that the opponent will 
cooperate while the latter also shows direct positive effects on actions. In addition, we posit 
that the presence of punishment or reward may make the payoff-dominant equilibrium more 
salient rather than changing people’s preferences. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces the experimental design. Section 3 discusses 
the main experimental results. Section 4 presents a further analysis where the presence of 
centralized punishment and reward would not transform the original prisoner’s dilemma 
game into a coordination game. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2  Experimental Design 
There were two types of stag hunt games in our experiment. Each was played in both 
experimental and control conditions. The experimental and control treatments differed only in 
the information revealed. In other words, games played in these two treatment conditions 
were essentially identical. We will give details of the treatment conditions in the next 
subsection. Before subjects made their decisions, we asked them to predict the likelihood of 
their opponent making a cooperative decision. Beliefs have been found to be closely related 
to decisions in the literature (see, e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg 2006; Croson 2007). It has 
been suggested that contextual factors affect behavior through beliefs (Dufwenberg et al. 
2011; Ellingsen et al. 2012). Belief elicitation allows us to explore how information about 
institutional rules shapes beliefs, which in turn spells action. Note that the revealed 
information about institutional rules may have a hybrid quality (i.e., shaping behavior 
through beliefs and shaping action directly). It would be interesting to see whether 
information about institutional rules regarding punishment and reward functions through 
different channels.  
In addition to beliefs, we also elicited subjects’ risk attitude. It has been shown in the 
literature that risk preferences and decisions under strategic uncertainty are closely related. 
For instance, risk preferences relate to trust (Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004; Schechter 2007), 
coordination (Heinemann et al. 2009), behavioral patterns deviating from Nash in matching 
pennies games (Goeree et al. 2003), and contribution in public goods games (Teyssier 2012). 
We used the multiple price list method similar to the one used by Holt and Laury (2002). 
                                                 
5 Unless stated otherwise, “beliefs” throughout this paper means agents’ beliefs that the other player will 
cooperate. It measures the subjective probability that the other player would cooperate.  
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Subjects were presented with 10  paired choices, one of which (option A) generated a 
deterministic payoff and the other (option B) generated two possible payoffs with certain 
probabilities. Table 1 presents the paired choices used in this risk elicitation. A risk neutral 
person would switch from option A to option B at line 5. The later the switch, the more risk 
averse the individual. The switching point informs us about one’s risk attitude.  
 
[Enter Table 1 Here] 
 
2.1 Experimental Treatments 
There were four treatments altogether. Figure 1 presents all the games involved in our 
experiment.6 Subjects in all treatments played either stag hunt game 1 or stag hunt game 2. In 
the two experimental treatments, subjects were given information on how the stag hunt game 
is developed from the prisoner’s dilemma game by introducing punishment or reward. The 
other two treatments served as baselines where subjects played stag hunt games without any 
information on the transformation process. Comparison between the experimental and 
baseline treatments sheds light on how revealed information affects equilibrium selection. In 
what follows, we explain the treatment conditions in detail.  
 
[Enter Figure 1 here] 
 
The punish_stag1 treatment 
In this treatment, subjects played the stag hunt game 1 shown in Figure 1, however in 
addition were also informed that the stag hunt game 1 is transformed from the prisoner’s 
dilemma game (pd game) shown in Figure 1 using a S$2 punishment scheme imposed on the 
unilateral defector. Consequently, if a subject unilaterally defects from C to D, her payoff is 
only S$2 instead of S$4. The revealed information on punishment serves as a reminder that 
defection is a discouraged behavior. Compared to the original pd game, defection becomes a 
less attractive strategy, too.  
                                                 
6In the instructions, we refer to players as “ROW” or “COLUMN” player. Their strategies “C” and “D” are 
referred to “Up” and “Down” for the row player, and “Left” and “Right” for the column player. We use “C” and 
“D” hereafter for convenience. 
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The reward_stag2 treatment 
Subjects played the stag hunt game 2 indicated in Figure 1. Again, the transformation 
process was revealed to the subjects. The original basic game is the same prisoner’s dilemma 
game as that in the punish_stag1 treatment. A S$2 reward for mutual cooperation is 
introduced, which transforms the game into stag hunt game 2 . That is, if both subjects 
manage to mutually cooperate, each of them receives S$5 instead of only S$2. The revelation 
of the reward mechanism serves as a reminder that cooperation is a more attractive strategy 
and is encouraged by the central planner. 
The baseline treatments (stag1 & stag2) 
We have two baseline treatments. The first one is stag1 treatment, which serves as the 
baseline treatment for the punish_stag1 treatment, and the second one is stag2 treatment, 
which serves as the baseline treatment for the reward_stag2 treatment. In these two baseline 
treatments, subjects simply played stag hunt game 1 and 2 without any information about 
mechanisms that transform the original prisoner’s dilemma game into the stag hunt games. 
2.2 The Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at Nanyang Technological University and was 
programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). We conducted two sessions each for the 
punishment_stag1 and the reward_stag2 treatments and four sessions each for the stag1 and 
the stag2 treatments. The number of subjects in each session ranged from 20 to	26. In total, 
292  subjects participated in the experiment. Each session lasted around 70  minutes on 
average. The average earnings were about S$20 (roughly US$16), including a S$2 show-up 
fee. All subjects were recruited through a university-level email system. They came from 
various academic backgrounds, including science, engineering, social science, and business. 
We had a between-subject design so that each subject only participated in one session. No 
one had participated in a similar experiment before.  
The experiment consisted of two stages. The first was the main game stage, followed by 
risk preference elicitation in the second. We provided hard-copy instructions on paper as well 
as on screen. The paper instructions were read aloud by an experimenter before the 
experiment started.7 All questions were answered in private. Subjects played two practice 
periods and then proceeded to play 25 real periods. Each player’s role (row or column player) 
                                                 
7The instructions used in the experiment can be found in the appendix. 
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was randomly drawn every period. The pair composition was reshuffled from period to 
period, too.  
Before subjects made their decision in every period, they were asked to make a prediction 
about their opponent’s propensity to cooperate. The prediction was incentivized to elicit true 
beliefs. One out of 25 predictions was randomly selected as the payment foundation for 
belief elicitation. If the prediction fell into the correct range, an extra S$4 would be added to 
payment. No feedback on beliefs was given until subjects finished the 25 periods of play. 
However, subjects were informed of their opponent’s decision at the end of each period. 
Among the 25 real periods, five were randomly selected as the payment for the decision part. 
After playing the game for 25 periods, subjects entered into the risk preference elicitation 
stage. Their choice in one out of ten lines was randomly selected as the payment for the 
second stage. This completed the experiment. Subjects were asked to complete a 
questionnaire regarding demographics after the experiment.  
3 Experimental Results 
In this section, we start with a descriptive summary of the experimental results, followed 
by some regression analyses. As a robustness check and also an extension of the current study, 
we also briefly present results from three additional treatments whereby subjects play the 
prisoner’s dilemma game rather than stag hunt coordination game. That is, in these three 
additional treatments the amount of reward and punishment is smaller than the amount set in 
the our main treatments, such that the original prisoner’s dilemma game would remain as the 
prisoner’s dilemma game rather than being transformed into a coordination game.    
3.1 Data Summary 
Figure 2 illustrates the mean cooperation rate over time in all treatments. Note that games 
played in the punish_stag1 and stag1 treatments, and the reward_stag2 and stag2 treatments 
were identical, respectively. The only difference between the two treatments is that subjects 
in the former treatment were informed of the original prisoner’s dilemma game and the 
transformation process involving punishment or reward.8 It can be seen that the starting 
                                                 
8 In the punish_stag1 and the reward_stag2 treatments, subjects were presented with both the stag hunt game 
and the original prisoner’s dilemma game, one might question if subjects understood the game. To prove that 
subjects did understand the game, we compared the cooperation rate in the prisoner’s dilemma treatment (a 
treatment where subjects played the original prisoner’s dilemma game) to that in the stag1 and stag2 treatments 
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cooperation rates in all treatments are almost identical and they remain relatively close to 
each other in the first five periods. Cooperation rates start to diverge after period 5.  
 
[Enter Figure 2 Here] 
 
Cooperation rates in the punish_stag1 and reward_stag2 treatments, where institutional 
rules were revealed, were generally higher than in the baseline treatments. The differences 
between punish_stag1 and stag1, and reward_stag2 and stag2 are both statistically significant 
(two-sided Mann-Whitney test, punish_stag1 vs stag1, p-value ൏ 0.01; reward_stag2 vs stag2, 
p-value ൌ 0.03).9 The difference between punish_stag1 and stag1 is larger, which suggests 
that revealing information about the punishment system might work better in terms of 
promoting cooperation.10  
Punishment reduces the payoff from defection while keeping the payoff from mutual 
cooperation unchanged. Consequently, unilateral defection becomes relatively less attractive 
than cooperation, and in turn it makes the payoff dominant equilibrium more salient. In 
contrast, reward increases the payoff from mutual cooperation while keeping the payoff from 
defection unchanged. It will thus also make unilateral defection relatively less attractive than 
cooperation, which will make the payoff dominant equilibrium more salient. In sum, both 
punishment and reward make the payoff dominant equilibrium more salient albeit through 
different channels. As a result, we should expect that the treatment with either punishment or 
reward should yield higher coordination rate on the payoff dominant outcome (C, C) than the 
standard prisoner’s dilemma treatment. Our result indeed shows that this is the case.  
In the baseline stag-hunt treatment (stag 1 or stag 2), subjects are shown the final payoffs 
from all pairs of strategies but not the initial prisoner’s dilemma game and the punishment or 
                                                                                                                                                        
(the control stag hunt games). It shows that the cooperation rate (C,C) in the prisoner’s dilemma game (see the 
bar chart for (C,C) in Pd treatment shown in Figure 5) is much lower than that in the stag hunt games (see the 
bar charts for (C,C) in Stag1 and Stag 2 shown in Figure 3). This suggests that subject did respond differently to 
the differing contingencies in these different types of games.  
9 We used subject averages across periods as units of observation, following Charness et al 
(2007).Specifically, for each subject we calculated the average cooperation rate over the 25 periods and used it 
as a unit of observation. That is to say, the number of observations is the number of subjects in each treatment 
(punish_stag1: N= 52; stag1: N = 96; reward_stag2: N = 52; stag2: N = 92). It is to eliminate correlation over 
time. This type of tests throughout the paper follows similar suit unless otherwise stated.    
10 It is well documented that punishment works better than reward in terms of promoting cooperation 
(Sigmund et al. 2001; Sefton et al. 2007). Interested readers may refer to an excellent review on this topic by 
Balliet and Mulder (2011).  
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reward mechanism. Notice that the payoffs used as the basis for making decisions in stag 1, 
stag 2, punish_stag1 and reward_stag2 treatments are exactly identical. The major difference 
is, however, in punish_stag1 and reward_stag2 treatments the information on the centralized 
punishment and reward scheme would make the payoffs from the payoff dominant 
equilibrium more salient. We show that the increase in saliency leads to higher rate of mutual 
cooperation.    
The next question is on the comparative performance of punishment and reward. Which of 
the mechanism would be more effective in encouraging mutual cooperation?  Prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) tells us that people are loss averse. When faced with 
information on punishment, people may put themselves into the prisoner’s dilemma game 
setting and they feel a loss with the implementation of punishment compared to what they 
would get without the punishment. The aversion to the sense of loss might induce people to 
cooperate more. Our results show that indeed punishment is more effective than reward in 
motivating people to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium. 
There seem to be different evolutionary patterns over time across treatments. It appears 
that the cooperation rate up to period 15 decays over time in the two baseline treatments. 
From period 15 onwards, the cooperation rate is relatively stable at around 55% in the stag2 
treatment and 40% in the stag1 treatment. In contrast, it increases slightly over time and 
reaches almost full cooperation at the end in the punish_stag1 treatment. The cooperation rate 
remains relatively stable at around 75% over time in the reward_stag2 treatment. The 
observation trends are verified by non-parametric tests. Using the average cooperation rate in 
the first five periods and the last five periods as units of observation, we find that the 
cooperation rate in the late periods is significantly higher in the punish_stag1 treatment (two-
sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, p-value ൏ 0.01), significantly lower in the 
two baseline treatments (p-value ൏ 0.01 in both the stag1 and stag2 treatments), and not 
significantly different from that in early periods in the reward_stag2 treatment (p-value ൌ
0.72).  
Beliefs are found to be closely related to cooperation (Spearman rank correlation tests, p-
value ൏ 0.01  in all treatments). The distribution of average beliefs is similar to the 
distribution of cooperation rates presented in Figure 2. Likewise, we find significant 
differences of belief between punish_stag1 and stag1, and reward_stag2 and stag2. The 
evolutionary patterns of beliefs are consistent with the trend of cooperation rates, too. 
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Figure 2 indicates that people have a higher tendency to cooperate if institutional rules are 
made transparent to them. Figure 3 delineates the extent to which such information sharing 
helps solve the coordination problem. It shows the distribution of mutual cooperation (the 
payoff-dominant equilibrium), mutual defection (the risk-dominant equilibrium), and 
disequilibrium outcomes by treatment.  
 
[Enter Figure 3 Here] 
 
Compared with the control stag1 treatment, there is a substantial decrease in mutual 
defection and a massive increase in mutual cooperation in the punish_stag1 treatment. In 
addition, disequilibrium outcomes decrease. Revealing the punishment mechanism that yields 
the final payoffs in the punish_stag1 game effectively solves the coordination problem. 
People settle with the payoff-dominant equilibrium much more frequently than the risk-
dominant equilibrium and end up with fewer disequilibrium outcomes. Information about the 
reward mechanism also helps people to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium albeit 
to some lesser degree. There is more mutual cooperation and less mutual defection in the 
reward_stag2 treatment than in the stag2 treatment. However, the improvement in 
coordination is of a smaller magnitude than that in the punish_stag1 treatment. In contrast to 
the decreased disequilibrium outcomes in the punish_stag1 treatment, disequilibrium 
outcomes slightly increase in the reward_stag2 treatment. This suggests that sharing 
information on mechanisms involving punishment and reward has different effects and may 
possibly work in different ways. We explore this issue in more detail in later sections. 11 
3.2 Regression Analyses 
Here we explore the formation of beliefs and the decision to cooperate.  
Table 2 presents OLS estimates of the determinants of subjects’ beliefs about their 
opponent’s decision. This belief is expressed as the likelihood that the opponent will 
                                                 
11 Our study relates to framing in a broad sense as the result is affected by how the game is described. In this 
strand of literature (e.g., see Erev and Roth 2014 for a review), it has been found that framing seems to come 
into effect through initial beliefs and therefore the explanatory power of it might be stronger in early periods 
(Cooper et al. 1990).  As a result, the smaller difference between treatments in early periods might be more 
informative. To verify this, we present the distribution of decision pair types for the first 10 periods in figure A3 
in supplementary appendix A. Observational conclusions from comparisons between treatments remain the 
same. We thank an anonymous referee for comments in this regard. 
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cooperate. Regressors include Period (ܲ݁ݎ݅݋݀), the subject’s belief in the previous period 
(Belief (t-1)), the opponent’s decision in the last three periods (Others’ Decision (t-1), Others’ 
Decision (t-2), Others’ Decision (t-3)),12 and the treatment dummy for the punish_stag1 
treatment (Punish_stag1), the treatment dummy for the reward_stag2 treatment 
(Reward_stag2).  
The belief formation process follows that used in Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), who 
find that in the context of public goods games, a subject’s belief in period ݐ is a weighted 
average of her belief in period ݐ െ 1 and other group members’ behavior in period	ݐ െ 1. In 
contrast with their findings that other group members’ behavior in earlier periods has no 
significant effects on the belief formation in the current period, these variables do show 
significant effects in our study and thus three lags are included in the model.  
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The left-hand panel estimates the belief formation in the stag hunt game 1, including the 
punish_stag1 and stag1 treatments. The right-hand panel estimates the belief formation 
process in the other stag hunt game. Belief in the previous period always has significantly 
positive effects on belief in the current period. The coefficient is of a substantial magnitude in 
both panels and is the main factor affecting belief in the current period. The opponent’s 
decisions in the last three periods are all significantly positive in the left-hand panel. The 
third lag becomes insignificant in the right-hand panel. In both panels, the significance of the 
opponent’s decision decreases substantially after the first lag. The treatment dummies for 
punish_stag1 and reward_stag2 are both positively significant. That is to say that after 
controlling for other variables, revealing information on the punishment or reward 
mechanism increases subjects’ belief in their opponent’s propensity to cooperate.1314 
                                                 
12As we used a random matching protocol, the opponent is likely to be different in each of these three 
periods. The regressor refers to the decision of the opponent in that a particular period. 
13Since a lagged dependent variable is used as a regressor, we also tried the “difference” and “system” 
generalized method-of-moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimation method for belief formation in individual 
treatments (Roodman 2009). However, the long panel T and relatively small N lead to an explosive number of 
instruments, which may generate bias in estimates as indicated by a perfect Hansen statistic of 1.000. 
14 We also present the results using only the first 10 periods in table A1 in the supplementary appendix A. 
Conclusions remain qualitatively the same except that the treatment dummy for the reward_stag2 treatment 
becomes insignificant. It might be because of a smaller difference between the reward_stag2 and stag2 
15 
So far we have shown that merely revealing institutional rules increases subjects’ beliefs 
in their opponent’s cooperative behavior. In what follows, we explore the determinants of 
decisions. Table 3 shows Probit estimates of the determinants of the cooperative decision. 
The dependent variable is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the subject decides to 
cooperate and 0  otherwise. Explanatory variables are the subject’s belief about their 
opponent’s propensity to cooperate (Belief),15 Period (Period), the number of safe options 
taken in the lottery (No. of safe options), and treatment dummies for the punish_stag1 and 
reward_stag2 treatments (punish_stag1, reward_stag2). The table also reports the marginal 
probability change at the sample mean of regressors while for binary variables, the marginal 
effects report the probability change when the indicator variable changes from 0 to 1.16  
One’s belief apparently carries a lot of weight in decision making. The coefficient is 
always positively significant and of a substantial magnitude. One is much more likely to 
cooperate if she believes her opponent will do so too. It has been shown earlier that revealing 
institutional rules helps increase subjects’ belief in others’ propensity to cooperate. This 
increased belief then leads to more cooperation. The effect of beliefs on behavior seems to be 
universal for both mechanisms. The risk attitude has mixed effects depending on the payoff 
structure of the coordination game. It has no effect in stag hunt game 1, where the difference 
in the cooperator’s monetary payoff between the payoff-dominant equilibrium and 
disequilibrium is relatively small (3  ݒݏ  0 ). The effect is marginally significant if the 
difference increases (5 ݒݏ 0). The negative sign in the right-hand panel suggests that the 
more risk-averse a person is, the less likely she is to cooperate in stag hunt game 2. It might 
be the case that the more risk-averse person is, the less willing she is to take risks under 
strategic uncertainty if the cost of being a “sucker” is relatively high (i.e., the “sucker” gets 0 
unless coordination is successful, in which case, she receives S$5). The treatment dummy for 
punish_stag1 is positively significant. This suggests that, controlling for other factors, 
revealing the punishment mechanism increases the likelihood of cooperation by 17 
                                                                                                                                                        
treatments before steady equilibrium is achieved. This result is consistent with the analysis on decision, which 
suggests that information on these two mechanisms may work differently.  
15One may worry about the endogeneity of beliefs. On the one hand, it is not uncommon for belief to be used 
as a regressor in the literature (see, e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg 2006; Croson 2007; Fischbacher and Gächter 
2010; Dufwenberg et al. 2011); on the other, we applied the two-stage least squares estimation method, treating 
belief as an endogenous variable. Our conclusion remains the same. 
16As for belief formation and cooperation, we also applied the random effects model. Since the estimation 
results are very similar to OLS, only OLS results are reported. 
16 
percentage. However, we do not find similar effects regarding the reward mechanism, as 
indicated by the insignificant coefficient in the right-hand panel.17  
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In summary, we find that revealing institutional rules helps increase subjects’ belief in 
their opponent’s propensity to cooperate, which improves their own cooperation. This 
channel is universal for both types of information (i.e., information on both punishment and 
reward mechanisms). In addition to affecting beliefs, revealing the punishment mechanism 
directly improves cooperation too. It seems to have a hybrid quality (i.e., affecting behavior 
both through beliefs and directly). However, we do not find a similar hybrid quality for 
information about the reward mechanism.  
4. Institutional Rules in Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Games 
Thus far, we have analyzed the effects of revealing institutional rules on cooperation in 
stag hunt coordination games. It is noteworthy that in the absence of reward or punishment, 
the original game is a prisoner’s dilemma game. The presence of reward or punishment 
transforms the prisoner’s dilemma game into a coordination game, wherein cooperation 
becomes an equilibrium strategy. Consequently, if we observe that cooperation rate increases, 
we are not sure whether it is solely because the revealed institutional rules make the mutual 
cooperation equilibrium more salient or because the revealed punishment or reward 
mechanism changes people’s preferences for cooperation. People might perceive the 
institutional rules as a signal from the central authority to encourage cooperation, making 
them more willing to cooperate.  
To shed light on the issue, we ran three additional treatments using prisoner’s dilemma 
games. In the current study, we have focused on stag hunt coordination games that were 
developed from prisoner’s dilemma games by introducing punishment or reward. 
Coordination games were our baselines. To isolate equilibrium saliency from changed 
                                                 
17 We present the results using the first 10 period in table A2 in the supplementary appendix A. Conclusions 
remain qualitatively unchanged.  
17 
preferences, we employed a set of prisoner’s dilemma games where equilibrium saliency is 
absent as cooperation is no longer an equilibrium strategy. We used the prisoner’s dilemma 
game in Figure 1 as the baseline in the added treatments, and implemented a punishment or 
reward mechanism. We chose the punishment or reward amount that is sufficiently small so 
that the game remained as a prisoner’s dilemma game instead of being transformed into a 
stag hunt coordination game. Since cooperation is not an equilibrium strategy, more 
cooperation, if any, may be attributable to changed preferences for cooperation due to the 
punishment or reward mechanism. Mechanisms in prisoner’s dilemma games were supposed 
to be more powerful in shaping preferences than those used in stag hunt games. Compared 
with the baseline, not only was the signal delivered that cooperation was encouraged and that 
defection was discouraged, but the actual payoff also changed because of the use of 
punishment and reward. However, information about punishment and reward was revealed by 
signal delivery and the payoff remained the same as the baseline in the stag hunt games.  
We had two sessions for each treatment. The number of subjects in each session was either 
24  or 26 . The experimental procedure was similar to other treatments. In the baseline 
treatment (pd treatment), subjects played the prisoner’s dilemma game shown in Figure 1. In 
the treatment with punishment (punish_pd treatment), subjects were shown the pd game and 
were told that there was a S$0.50 punishment for unilateral defection. In the treatment with 
reward (reward_pd), subjects were informed of the pd game and a S$0.50 reward for mutual 
cooperation. The payoff structure after punishment or reward was also displayed. Note that 
the game remained a prisoner’s dilemma after punishment or reward was implemented.  
Figure 4 delineates the average cooperation rate over time in the three treatments. The 
typical decaying trend over time appears in all three treatments. We do not see much 
difference between the experimental and baseline treatments. Using subjects’ average 
cooperate rates over time as units of observation, none of the differences is statistically 
significant (two-sided Mann-Whitney test, pd vs punish_pd, p-value ൌ 0.85 ; pd vs 
reward_pd, p-value ൌ 0.11). The use of punishment and reward does not seem to increase 
cooperation.18  
 
[Enter Figure 4 Here] 
                                                 
18 The number of observations in each of treatment is thus equal to the number of subjects participating in 
each treatment. That is, N = 50 for the pd treatment, N = 50 for the punish_pd treatment, and N = 50 for the 
reward_pd treatment. 
18 
 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of types of decision pairs. The unique Nash equilibrium 
(i.e., mutual defection) is clearly the dominant type in all treatments. The proportion of the 
socially efficient outcome (i.e., mutual cooperation) is close to zero. We do not observe much 
difference between treatments. The use of punishment or reward in the prisoner’s dilemma 
game does not make people cooperate more even though they are encouraged to do so. 
Therefore, behaviors do not seem to change in the presence of punishment or reward as long 
as the punishment and reward does not lead to a transformation of the original prisoner’s 
dilemma game into a stag hunt coordination game. 19 
 
[Enter Figure 5 Here] 
5  Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was to study the role of information on institutional rules regarding 
the underlying reward and punishment mechanisms for equilibrium selection in stag hunt 
games. We had two experimental treatments with full information and two control treatments. 
In the full information treatment, subjects were informed how the prisoner’s dilemma game 
was transformed into a stag hunt game by introducing reward or punishment. In the control 
treatment, this information was absent. We elicited subjects’ beliefs about their opponent’s 
behavior before each round of play. We were also interested to know how the revealed 
information shapes subjects’ behavior by investigating the dynamics of their beliefs and 
decisions. To find out whether the presence of reward and punishment changes preferences, 
we added three additional treatments using the prisoner’s dilemma game, where cooperation 
is not an equilibrium strategy.  
Our results indicate that sharing information on institutional rules is effective in inducing 
cooperation. The occurrence of coordination failure is substantially reduced. Revealing 
information about the reward and punishment mechanisms increased subjects’ belief in their 
opponent’s propensity to cooperate, which in turn spells action. Besides working through 
beliefs, information about punishment mechanisms has direct positive effects on decisions. 
                                                 
19 We present the result only using the first 10 periods in figure A3 in the supplementary appendix A. 
Comparisons between the results from the two treatments across all periods show that they are not much 
different.  
19 
We do not find similar direct effects on action for information about reward mechanisms. 
Moreover, the results from the prisoner’s dilemma games suggest that the use of reward and 
punishment does not make people more willing to cooperate when cooperation is not an 
equilibrium strategy. Thus, we posit that the revelation of information about the reward and 
punishment mechanism makes the payoff-dominant equilibrium more salient rather than 
changing people’s preferences.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1.  The ten paired lotteries 
Line Option A Option B Expected payoff difference 
1 $1  3 of 0%, 0 of 100% $1  
2 $1  3 of 10%, 0 of 90% $0.70  
3 $1  3 of 20%, 0 of 80% $0.40  
4 $1  3 of 30%, 0 of 70% $0.10  
5 $1  3 of 40%, 0 of 60% -$0.20 
6 $1  3 of 50%, 0 of 50% -$0.50 
7 $1  3 of 60%, 0 of 40% -$0.80 
8 $1  3 of 70%, 0 of 30% -$1.10 
9 $1  3 of 80%, 0 of 20% -$1.40 
10 $1  3 of 90%, 0 of 10% -$1.70 
 
 
 
 
Prisoner’s dilemma game
  C D 
 C 3, 3 0, 4 
D 4, 0 1.5, 1.5 
 
Stag hunt game 1
  C D 
 C 3, 3 0, 2 
D 2, 0 1.5, 1.5 
 
Stag hunt game 2
  C D 
 C 5, 5 0, 4 
D 4, 0 1.5, 1.5 
 
                Figure 1. The games in our experiment 
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Figure 2. Mean cooperation rate over time in the coordination games 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Distributions of decision pair type in the coordination games 
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Table 2.  Belief formation in the coordination games 
Dependent variable: Belief about the opponent’s decision 
Punish_stag1 vs Stag1 Reward_stag2 vs Stag2 
Period 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Belief (t-1) 0.732*** 0.813*** 
(0.023) (0.024) 
Others’ Decision (t-1) 0.101*** 0.070*** 
(0.008) (0.007) 
Others’ Decision (t-2) 0.030*** 0.013** 
(0.007) (0.006) 
Others’ Decision (t-3) 0.031*** 0.008 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Punish_stag1 0.018*** 
(0.006) 
Reward_stag2 0.012** 
(0.006) 
Constant 0.047*** 0.048*** 
(0.009) (0.011) 
Observations 3,256 3,168 
R2 0.845   0.774 
Note: OLS regressions with clustering on individuals. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
     *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
       ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
         * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 3. Cooperation in the coordination games 
Dependent variable: Cooperation decision = 1 
Punish_stag1 vs Stag1 Reward_stag2 vs Stag2 
Probit Marginal effects Probit Marginal effects 
Belief 5.291*** 1.922*** 4.100*** 1.384*** 
(0.276) (0.113) (0.423) (0.153) 
Period -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.002 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) 
No. of Safe Options -0.026 -0.010 -0.075* -0.025* 
(0.039) (0.014) (0.042) (0.014) 
Punish_stag1 0.485*** 0.169*** 
(0.180) (0.059) 
Reward_stag2 0.163 0.054 
(0.189) (0.062) 
Constant -2.716*** -1.597*** 
(0.234) (0.391) 
Observations 3,700 3,700 3,600 3,600 
Note: Probit regressions with clustering on individuals. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
    *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
      ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
        * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Figure 4. Mean cooperation rate over time in the prisoner’s dilemma games 
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Figure 5. Type of decision pair in the prisoner’s dilemma games 
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